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1 The World after Babel 
 
After the flood, as is said in the Bible,1 the descendents of Noah were forced to disperse over the 
face of the earth. ‘And the whole earth was of one language, and of one speech.’ Instead of each 
going his own way, people stuck together and founded a city in which they started building a 
tower ‘whose top may reach unto heaven.’ However, the Lord was not pleased with their efforts 
to ‘make a name’ for themselves. He seemed to fear the power of one people united by one 
language: ‘Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language; and this they begin to do: 
and now nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do.’ Therefore, he 
decided to ‘confound their language,’ so ‘that they may not understand one another’s speech.’ 
The people stopped building the tower, left the city and spread all over the earth. The city was 
named, as is commonly known, ‘Babel’ (which originally meant freedom, but after its 
breakdown it signified confusion). It became a symbol of human arrogance or hybris, although 
opinions differ on the exact nature of the sins committed by man.2 
 
Teubner’s plea for a ‘common law constitution’3 can be read as a way of dealing with the world 
after Babel. Our world has fallen apart into many different languages, and each language 
constitutes a foreign language to the other. How could this happen? Teubner discerns two phases 
in the downfall of man. The first phase is located in the paradisiacal state of nature, before Babel 
so to speak, in which man and nature were one. It marks the transition from a communication-
free world to a world of communication: ‘The original Fall of Man happens at the Tree of 
                                                            
* The author thanks the anonymous reviewers for their constructive comments and the editor Lyana Francot-
Timmermans for her advice and support. 
1 The following quotations are taken from Genesis 11:1-9 in the translation of the King James Bible. 
2 In Oakeshott’s reading of the myth, for instance, the Tower of Babel represents the vain effort to turn the state into 
an enterprise by compelling people to pursue one and the same goal. Cf. Michael Oakeshott, “The Tower of Babel,” 
in: On History and Other Essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), 179-210. According to Jacques Derrida, “From 
‘Des Tours de Babel’,” in: A Derrida Reader. Between the Blinds, ed. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1991), 243-53, its destruction put an end to the imperialistic aspirations of the Semitic family to 
establish its empire and spread its language (see also note 36). Michel Foucault, Les mots et les choses. Une 
archéologie des sciences humaines (Paris: Gallimard 1966), 51, points out that as a result the original unity between 
words and things was destroyed. However, he does not give any explanation for this divine punishment. 
3 This notion is taken from Hurrell and is cited approvingly in Teubner TFR, 6. 
Knowledge: the meaning-producing force of communication, with its ability to distinguish good 
and evil, destroys the original unity of man and nature, makes man god-like and leads to the loss 
of Paradise. The origin of alienation lies in the very first communication.’4 The second phase 
takes place many years after Babel, in our age of modernity, and is characterized by ‘the 
autonomization of a multiplicity of separate communicative worlds.’5 Originally, people shared a 
mode of communication which made it possible to pass moral judgments, but after the ‘second 
Fall’6 the world became fragmented into separate social systems each with a code of its own and 
no prospect of a meaningful exchange between them.  
 
It is for this semantically shattered world that Teubner, in a courageous effort,  tries to devise a 
common normative ground in the shape of fundamental rights. In the confusion of tongues, 
social systems theory has created a unified scientific language to describe the various social 
systems that make up society by adopting concepts from different disciplines such as biology, 
linguistics, sociology and political theory. It does not aim at overcoming our current condition of 
radical fragmentation (it is no nostalgic attempt to regain a paradise lost), but at setting limits to 
the communicative imperialism of some systems over others. In that sense, it continues the 
modern Kantian project of emancipation as an escape from speechlessness,7 albeit in a 
postmodern, detached and posthuman manner. Below, I first describe in more detail how the 
world after Babel looks like according to Teubner, what he considers to be its main problems and 
what kinds of solutions he suggests (section 2). Subsequently, I raise some critical questions 
about (i) the ambiguous role man plays in his theory, either as a person or as a human being; (ii) 
the exclusive, if not excessive focus on communication, both as problem and solution; and, 
above all, (iii) the apparent lack of a solid institutional framework for the creation and 
enforcement of basic communicative rights (section 3). Finally, some tentative suggestions for an 
alternative approach are presented (section 4). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
4 Gunther Teubner, “The Anonymous Matrix. Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors,” The 
Modern Law Review (2006): 327-47, 336. Since Teubner explicitly asked the respondents to take this article – which 
to some extent overlaps with the paper at hand – into account when discussing his paper, I will refer to it 
occasionally.  
5 Teubner 2006, 336.  
6 Contra Marx (and, before Marx, Rousseau), Teubner denies that the second Fall had anything to do with the 
emergence of private property. Human rights in their modern sense made their appearance, or so he argues, after the 
second Fall.  
7 Kant defined ‘Enlightenment’ famously as ‘man’s emergence from his self-incurred immaturity’ or, more properly, 
‘speechlessness’ (‘Unmündigkeit’; Immanuel Kant, “What Is Enlightenment?,” in: Political Writings , ed. H.S. Reiss 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 54-60, 54). However, the speechlessness which Teubner refers to 
is not self-incurred in Kant’s sense – that is, it is not a product of man’s lack of determination or courage – but is 
caused by what he calls the ‘Matrix’ (see further below) . 
 
2 The Fragmentation of Society 
 
In Teubner’s view, modern society (taken as a global entity)8 is characterized by functional 
differentiation and fragmentation. It is comprised of various ‘autonomous function systems,’9 
such as law, politics, religion, economy, science, art and so on, which operate independently of 
each other and have developed their own modes of communication (based on their specific codes 
and programs) and their own standards of rationality. The differentiation and dissemination of 
these autonomous subsystems lead to a fragmentation of society. In this progressive process of 
fragmentation, steadily new boundaries are created – boundaries between subsystems and people 
(outside society) on the one hand, and between separate subsystems (inside society) on the other. 
Thus subsystems are not only closed off from each other but also from human beings: ‘society 
and mind/body are not communicatively accessible to each other.’10 Communication frees itself 
from human consciousness, which is merely the ‘channel’ through which communication takes 
place: ‘Communication becomes autonomous from people, creating its own world of meaning 
separate from the individual mind.’11  The greatest threats that face us nowadays, according to 
Teubner, are the ‘dangers stemming from the anonymous “matrix”,’ that is, ‘autonomized 
communicative processes (institutions, functional systems, networks) that are not personified as 
collectives.’12 In particular, he warns against the ‘expansive’ or ‘totalitarian’ tendencies of some 
systems (for instance, science, mass media or economy) that cross their borders and invade other 
systems (art, religion and, again, science are mentioned as examples).13 
 
The fragmentation of society forces us, as Teubner argues, to redefine the concept of 
fundamental rights as protective rights. Traditionally, fundamental rights can only be invoked 
when norms are violated by individuals or, under certain conditions, by collective actors (states, 
companies, associations and so on). So far, the discussion in legal and political practice as well 
as theory has focused on the question whether fundamental rights could have ‘horizontal’ effect, 
that is could be applied in the relationship between private actors. However, conflicts no longer 
occur solely or predominantly on the level of individual interactions and collectives, and between 
those two levels, but increasingly they acquire an (inter- and intra)systemic character. As the 
HIV catastrophe in South Africa shows, it does not suffice to hold particular pharmaceutical 
firms liable for charging excessive prices for antiretrovirals; instead, one has to question on a 
more fundamental level the logic by which the norms of economic rationality take precedence 
                                                            
8 Teubner focuses on nothing less than ‘world society’ in its totality (Teubner 2006, 341). 
9 Teubner TFR, 15. 
10 Teubner 2006, 334. Niklas Luhmann, Risk. A Sociological Theory, tr. Rhodes Barrett (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 
1993), xii, states, ‘Consciousness is an indispensable condition for communication, but is not in itself 
communication.’ I owe this reference to Lyana Francot-Timmermans. 
11 Teubner 2006, 335.  
12 Teubner 2006, 340-1. 
13 Teubner 2006, 342. 
over norms formed in the health sector.14 By violating the autonomy of social discourses, 
powerful communicative processes constituting the Matrix pose a threat to the ‘integrity of 
institutions, persons and individuals.’15 In order to create a ‘counter-principle,’16 Teubner 
proposes to reformulate fundamental rights at these three levels and to classify them accordingly 
in (at least17) three categories: (i) institutional rights that protect the autonomy of social 
discourses against invasions from others discourses; (ii) personal rights that secure the autonomy 
of communications between persons (as ‘social artefacts’); and (iii) human rights which can be 
invoked when border crossings by communicative media endanger the integrity of ‘individuals’ 
body and mind.’18  
 
In the end, Teubner is not very optimistic about the success of his own enterprise: ‘This program 
of justice is ultimately doomed to fail and (…) has (…) to face up to its being in principle 
impossible.’19 The legal system can only be ‘irritated’ by it and will inevitably translate and 
transform its claims in the legal code. Therefore, the stakes are not set too high: instead of trying 
to creating just situations, the enterprise aims at removing unjust situations caused by the 
‘inhumanities of communication.’20  
 
3 The Matrix Revolutions 
 
Originally, in the hands of its founder, Niklas Luhmann, social systems theory offered a 
detached, almost clinical description of society, focusing on social subsystems and their 
environment instead of on human beings and their actions. What Teubner adds to social systems 
theory is an ambitious normative and crypto-humanistic program that is both self-affirming – it 
intends to empower people and social discourses threatened by dominant communicative 
processes – and self-defeating – it acknowledges in advance its defeat against the all-powerful 
Matrix. As Teubner argues, ‘[p]eople are the environment for the communicative networks, to 
whose operations they are exposed without being able to control them.’21 Though I sympathize 
with Teubner’s emancipatory objective, I will present below some critical comments concerning 
the conceptual, normative and institutional foundation of his approach which question the 
desirability of the means chosen for attaining this objective, as well as their efficacy (for other 
reasons than the Matrix’s sovereignty, only). In particular, I have difficulties with, first, the 
ambivalent role that is assigned to man, either as a person or as a human being; second, the 
reduction of social problems to problems of communication; and, finally and most importantly, 
                                                            
14 Teubner 2006, 327-8 and 344-5, discusses this example in more detail.  
15 Teubner 2006, 340. 
16 Teubner TFR, 22. 
17 Teubner 2006, 342, suggests a fourth category of ecological rights (see section 3.2).  
18 Teubner 2006, 342, and Teubner TFR, 19. 
19 Teubner TFR, 22. 
20 Teubner TFR, 22. 
21 Teubner 2006, 333. 
the attempt to conceive of law and politics beyond established legal and political institutions, 
which in my view is doomed to fail. 
 
3.1 The Actual People 
At first sight, it may seem odd that a posthuman social theory such as systems theory suddenly 
takes an interest in the human.22 Social systems theory is primarily focused on social systems; 
since these systems are considered to be constituted by communication, people can only appear 
as part of the ‘environment’. Social systems are not capable of communicating with people, only 
through them – human consciousness is the channel through which the codes of different systems 
flow and are disseminated. Each system creates man in its own image: homo economicus in the 
economic system, homo politicus in the political system, the homo juridicus in the law and so on. 
From the viewpoint of social systems theory, people can only be conceived of as persons 
construed by social systems or, in Teubner’s words, as ‘artefacts of communication,’23 ‘social 
person-constructs’ or ‘communicative representatives of actual human beings.’24 Interestingly, 
however, as the last qualification shows, social systems theory keeps alive the idea that some 
‘real’ entities are hidden behind all these semantic constructions. These ‘actual human beings,’ 
also referred to as ‘people “out there”’ or simply ‘body/mind,’25 cannot be presented directly by 
social systems (nor by social systems theory that aims at describing these systems) but can only 
be represented in their personhood, although their presence is sensed somehow by mutual 
irritation: ‘It is through the mask of the “person” that the social systems make contact with 
people; while they cannot communicate with them, they massively irritate them and in turn be 
irritated by them.’26 Teubner accuses the traditional human-rights approach of identifying 
artificial semantic constructions with actual human beings:  
 
‘[I]f one takes the difference seriously by seeing the “person” as a mere semantic artifact 
of social communication on the one hand, and mind and body as living, pulsing entities in 
the communication’s environment on the other, it becomes clear that the humanistic 
equation of those semantic artefacts with actual people is precisely what does not do 
justice to flesh and blood people.’27 
 
                                                            
22 I do not intend to claim that social systems theory contributes to a ‘dehumanization’ of society, as some critics 
have argued against Luhmann (such as Walter Kargl, “Kommunikation kommuniziert? Kritik des 
rechtssoziologischen Autopoiesebegriffs, ” Rechtstheorie (1990): 352-73). However, in its description of society 
social systems theory take no longer human beings (including their actions, thoughts and emotions) as its object but 
rather systems and communicative operations within systems. This shift of attention is captured in the notion of the 
‘posthuman’. 
23 Teubner 2006, 337. 
24 Teubner TFR, 17. 
25 Teubner TFR, 20. 
26 Teubner TFR, 17. 
27 Teubner 2006, 334 (original italics). 
It is precisely for the ‘flesh and blood people,’ the ‘actual people’ or ‘living, pulsing entities’ 
equipped with mind and body that Teubner has designed his normative program. He wants to 
protect the ‘actual people’ from the ‘fatal equation’28 with persons and safeguard their integrity 
against the manipulations and machinations of the Matrix: ‘The human-rights question in the 
strictest sense must today be seen as endangerment of individuals’ integrity of body and mind by 
a multiplicity of anonymous, autonomized and today globalised communicative processes.’29 
According to Teubner, this threat to the biological, ‘natural’ existence of human beings calls for 
the recognition of fundamental rights, conceived as natural, that is, ‘original’ or intrinsic rights: 
‘(…) communication can irritate psycho-physical processes in such a way as to threaten their 
self-preservation. Or it may simply destroy them. This is the place where the body and mind of 
individuals (not of “persons”) demand their “pre-legal”, “pre-political”, even “pre-social” (ie 
extrasocietal) “latent intrinsic rights.”’30 
 
Thus a strict dichotomy is created between ‘persons’ or artificial constructions fabricated within 
the various subsystems in society (on whom the traditional human-rights approach is focused) on 
the one hand, and ‘people’ or natural beings of flesh and blood (for whom Teubner has designed 
his normative program of fundamental rights) on the other. This raises, to begin with, the 
epistemological question how these ‘actual’ people can be known (if they exist). Who are 
actually these ‘actual’ people? Social systems theory is only capable of describing the person as 
an aggregate of the various, one-sided and defective, representations of man that subsystems 
produce on the basis of their specific (economic, legal, political or other) code. Social systems 
and social systems theory have no direct access to the ‘actual’ or real people ‘out there’; they can 
only sense the people’s presence indirectly, by irritation, like when a mosquito is penetrating a 
foreign body. So in order to really know the real people, one has to step outside the systems and 
systems theory and enter the dark territory called ‘environment’. Is there such a place, beyond 
the current representations and misrepresentations of man within society, where the people can 
be presented directly and where the ‘true’ pain of their ‘tortured bodies and hurt souls’31 can be 
revealed? And, if so, what does it look like? A phenomenologist may appeal to a shared 
common-sense world which can be known through our immediate experience, but for an 
adherent of social systems theory (at least in a classical Luhmannian style) this is a no-go area: 
the world after Babel is tragically and radically shattered into separate islands of communication. 
As a consequence, it becomes very difficult, if not impossible, to speak about man and his true 
nature.  
 
Teubner’s first intimations are not very promising. When referring to ‘natural’ or real human 
beings, he uses concepts which are highly ‘unnatural’, artificial and certainly not 
                                                            
28 Teubner 2006, 334. 
29 Teubner TFR, 19. 
30 Teubner 2006, 335. 
31 Teubner TFR, 18. 
commonsensical, including – as indicated heretofore – ‘psycho-physical processes,’ ‘living, 
pulsing entities’ and ‘body/mind.’ Teubner concentrates primarily on the biological, 
psychological and physical aspects of human existence and on the pain man in his biological 
existence may suffer. In a language full of pathos, he claims to be speaking on behalf of the 
‘tortured bodies and hurt souls’32 or the ‘suffering souls.’33 Leaving the safe havens of society, 
he seems to fall back on a rather reductive, utilitarian concept of man as a mere receptor of 
pleasure and pain. Whatever his concept of man as a partly artificial construct and a partly 
natural entity may be, it does not follow from his social systems theory and will necessarily 
conflict with its basic premise that our knowledge of the world is always partial and mediated by 
various system-specific codes.  
 
Obviously, Teubner’s construction of natural human beings has significant political implications 
for his view on the nature of the fundamental rights that have to be protected in our shattered 
world. In his opinion, human rights should protect the interests of homo communicans, in 
particular man’s ability to express his pain and suffering. Why should we care so much for 
communication and communicative rights?  
 
3.2 The Communication Cure 
According to Aristotle, man is by nature a social animal due to his ‘gift of speech.’34 Babel may 
have deprived us of the hope of ever reaching a universal mutual understanding, but that has not 
kept us from trying, however desperately and futilely perhaps, to get into contact with other 
people. In modern times the means of communication have expanded substantially, thanks to 
information technologies. The internet offers the possibility to engage in conversational activities 
with a steadily increasing circle of virtual friends. Given the omnipresence of communication in 
our contemporary world, it seems appropriate to translate the current catalogue of fundamental 
rights into basic communicative rights, as Teubner proposes. One of the main advantages of a 
reconceptualization of fundamental rights in terms of communication is that it directs our 
attention not only to individual instances of fundamental-rights violations (which may otherwise 
go unnoticed or be minimized) but, more importantly, to possible structural causes underlying 
these violations. Teubner is surely right when he argues that the HIV catastrophe in South Africa 
can be imputed to ‘imperialistic tendencies’35 of the economic code, rather than to the 
irresponsible behavior of some pharmaceutical firms, only.  
 
However, inevitably something always gets lost in translation.36 To begin with, some social 
problems may have other causes than communication or communication only. For instance, the 
                                                            
32 Teubner TFR, 18. 
33 Teubner 2006, 335. 
34 Aristotle, Politics, tr. William Ellis (Middlesex: Echo Library, 2006), 14-5. 
35 Teubner TFR, 15. 
36 By destroying the Tower of Babel, God has, according to Derrida 1991, 249, saddled mankind with the both 
impossible and necessary task of translation: ‘He at the same time imposes and forbids translation. He imposes it 
HIV problem world-wide is not only caused by the primacy of economic reasoning but originates 
in and is sustained by a libertarian sexual morality that allows men to satisfy their sexual urges 
without having to take responsibility for other people’s health. Accordingly, these problems 
require other solutions instead of or in addition to a fundamental rearrangement of the current 
communicative world order. In this case, what is needed – at least additionally – is an 
educational program that informs both (potential) victims and perpetrators about possible risks 
and preventive measures, as well as a public debate on the scope of man’s moral responsibilities 
towards his fellowmen.37 Communication may be a cure to some problems, but for other 
problems immediate action seems required, for instance when a people is threatened by an 
ecological catastrophe, a terrorist attack or famine due to poor harvests or overpopulation. 
Teubner seems to recognize that there is more to life than communication (but not much more),38 
when he adds to his catalogue of fundamental rights – though hesitantly and between brackets – 
a fourth category of so-called ecological rights, which are applicable in situations ‘where society 
endangers the integrity of natural processes.’39 As soon as one extra-societal category is 
introduced, the question arises whether more categories of a different kind could or should be 
distinguished, for example animal rights, group and collective rights or some other legal novelty.  
 
Subsequently, if Teubner is able to show that the given problems and corresponding solutions 
can be reformulated in terms of communication – I have no doubt that he is able to do so –, the 
question remains what exactly is gained and lost in this translation. Teubner’s common law 
constitution is even more general and vague than the traditional bills of fundamental rights, 
which include the right to life, the right to property, the right to privacy and so on. From a legal 
point of view, this has serious disadvantages in terms of applicability, amongst others (see 
further below). Politically and morally speaking, the interests at stake are indicated very roughly 
in a both abstract and alarming language: communication allegedly threatens the people’s 
‘integrity’40 and even their ‘self-preservation.’41 According to Teubner, fundamental rights serve 
a double, inclusionary and exclusionary function. On the one hand they seek to include people in 
the political sphere so that human beings acquire the opportunity to give expression to their 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
and forbids it, constrains, but as if to failure, the children who henceforth will bear his name, the name that he gives 
to the city. (…) Now, this idiom bears within itself the mark of confusion, it improperly means the improper, to wit: 
Bavel, confusion. Translation then becomes necessary and impossible, like the effect of a struggle for the 
appropriation of the name, necessary and forbidden in the interval between two absolute proper names.’ 
37 For a discussion of the different approaches to HIV- and AIDS-related education and their potential effects, see 
Esther A.J. Miedema, Claire Maxwell and Peter Aggleton, “Education about HIV-AIDS. Theoretical Underpinnings 
for a Practical Response,” Health Education Research (2011): 516-25. 
38 This is a variation on a songline from Morrissey: ‘There is more to life than books, you know / but not much 
more’ (taken from the song ‘Handsome Devil’, performed by The Smiths and released on their album Hatful of 
Hollow). 
39 Teubner 2006, 342. Significantly, in Teubner TFR this category does not even return. 
40 Teubner 2006, 335 and Teubner TFR, 12. 
41 Teubner 2006, 335. 
feelings of suffering and pain; on the other hand they intend to exclude politics from other social 
systems in order to save society from politicization.42  
 
In particular, it is not at all clear, if we build on Teubner’s concept of institutional rights, what 
constitutes the ‘proper space’ that should be attributed to a given system within the 
communicative world order. By arguing that some systems (such as economy, politics or 
science) have the tendency to trespass their boundaries, Teubner seems to imply that they are 
entitled to a space of their own, albeit within certain limits. How exactly are the boundaries of 
each and every system to be established, and on which (legal, political, moral or other) grounds? 
For instance, religion was very dominant in the earlier days of our western civilization, but it has 
lost its privileged position in the age of modernity, due to the ongoing secularization. Does that 
mean that less space should be attributed to religion (because many people no longer believe in 
it, let alone abide by it)? Or, on the contrary, should it be given more space (because it possibly 
has some intrinsic value which many people may fail to see to their own loss)? Likewise, should 
we resign ourselves to the marginal position art occupies in modern society?43 Moreover, is it not 
inevitable that in times of existential crisis some discourses44 – e.g., the economic discourse of 
thrift and austerity, the political discourse of safety or the scientific discourse of sustainability – 
invade and have to invade (to a greater or lesser extent) other discourses for the mere sake of 
survival? Conversely, it can be argued that some discourses, such as extremist political discourse 
or the pseudo-medical discourse of quackery, should be banned altogether, because they may be 
harmful to the people’s body and mind. Similar questions can be raised with regard to personal 
rights: should every person be granted the right to speak his mind, however vulgar, degrading, 
hateful, racist, sexist et cetera his language?  
 
In sum, definite normative standards are lacking with which the map of the global nomos of 
communication can be drawn and possibly illegal border crossings can be signaled and criticized. 
The question remains how these normative standards are to be established, by whom and on what 
grounds. Can there be a legal ‘super-discourse’ that regulates the internal and external operations 
of the various communicative processes composing society world-wide? 
 
3.3 Institutional Design 
The issues discussed above on the identity of the ‘actual’ people (section 3.1) and on the content, 
purpose and scope of basic communicative rights (section 3.2) could be solved, or at least be 
made manageable, if Teubner would offer some procedure for the creation and implementation 
                                                            
42 See further Teubner TRF, p. 9-10. 
43 In the course of the 19th century art has acquired a playing field within society, in which almost everything may be 
said and done. However, the price for this nearly unlimited freedom is social marginalization, as is demonstrated in 
Pierre Bourdieu, The Field of Cultural Production. Essays on Art and Literature (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 
part 1. 
44 In systems theory, discourse does not equal communication. Discourse may be considered to be one of the modes 
of communication (or a kind of semantics).  
of these rights or, in short, an institutional design. However, his suggestions on this point are 
very sketchy and not very helpful. Following a long tradition in the sociology of law,45 Teubner 
is highly critical about the existing legal and political institutions. In his view, they have the 
irresistible inclination to abuse their power by trespassing their boundaries: ‘Absolute power 
liberates unsuspected destructive forces. Centralized power for legitimate collective decisions, 
which develops a special language of its own, indeed a high-flown rationality of the political, has 
an inherent tendency to totalize them beyond any limit.’46 Moreover, he agrees with Luhmann 
that in the modern world central authority no longer exists.47 He argues that it is necessary ‘to 
develop new types of guarantee that limit the destructive potential of communication outside 
institutionalized politics against body and mind.’48 For that purpose, fundamental rights have to 
be realized beyond the state constitution. Instead of imposing a constitution top-down on the 
people, counter-institutions have to be created bottom-up in the decentralized and less 
formalized, institutionalized and politicized regions of society. ‘Here, social constitutionalism 
begins directly with the goal of constructing constitutionally guaranteed counter-institutions in 
social sub-areas.’49 
 
Traditionally, an institutional design has to account for three tasks that must be performed by the 
(state and/or counter-)institutions at hand: the determination and creation of legal norms 
(legislation), the application of these general norms to concrete cases (adjudication) and the 
law’s execution and enforcement (administration).50 In Teubner’s account, these tasks are 
aggregated and assigned to a variety of public and private, national and transnational institutions, 
whose interrelations are not clarified.51 With regard to legislation, Teubner acknowledges that 
some sort of positivization is required. By what right can fundamental rights be called ‘rights’? 
In accordance with a natural law conception of law, Teubner presupposes that fundamental 
rights, in particular human rights relating to actual people, are ‘already there’ somehow, before 
any institution has recognized them. By nature, people seem to have human rights which can be 
invoked whenever their mental and physical integrity is at stake. As quoted above,52 human 
rights are supposed to be ‘“pre-legal”, “pre-political”, even “pre-social” (ie extra-societal) “latent 
intrinsic rights.”’ These rights are called ‘pre-social’ (or ‘extra-social’), because they are ‘based 
on the “latent rights” of body and mind to their integrity,’ and they are ‘pre-political’ and ‘pre-
                                                            
45 In the same vein, Eugen Ehrlich introduced the concept of ‘living law’ in his Fundamental Principles of the 
Sociology of Law (New York: Arno Press, 1975, reprint of the 1936 edition), see chapters V-VIII. Not surprisingly, 
Teubner refers a couple of times approvingly to this notion (see further below).  
46 Teubner TFR, 15. 
47 Teubner TFR, 13. 
48 Teubner 2006, 339. 
49 Teubner TFR, 13. 
50 These tasks are, of course, distinguished in the classical principle of the trias politica and are, according to 
Oakeshott, essential to the Rule of Law. Cf. Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1975), 147 ff. 
51 Teubner TFR, 5, speaks about an ‘entwinement – but not a fusion – of national and transnational legal orders.’ 
52 See section 3.1. 
legal’ in that they are ‘built on the “living law” of human rights arising out of communicative 
conflicts in politics, morals, religion or law, and the resulting conflicts.’53 Departing from the 
natural law conception, Teubner stresses that these ‘rights’ – for which he himself uses inverted 
comma’s – do not possess ‘some pre-legal absolute validity.’54 At the same time he distances 
himself from positivism, when he claims that ‘positivizing them as technical law is not some free 
decision of the legislator, but is based on this double foundation of self-sustaining processes 
outside society and conflicts within.’55  
 
How, then, are fundamental ‘rights’ to be turned into ‘real’, that is legally valid, rights, if not by 
‘free decision of the legislator’? Firstly, the ‘latent intrinsic rights’ have to become manifest. 
That does not only mean that people have to give expression to their feelings of suffering, but 
also that society recognizes these outcries of the ‘colère publique’56 and responds to them in one 
way or another: ‘These latent “rights” become overt, however, only if bodily pain and mental 
suffering no longer remain unheard in their speechlessness, but succeed in irritating society’s 
communication and provoke new distinctions there.’57 In the legislative process, organizations 
such as protest movements, NGO’s and the mass media play an important mediating role 
between human beings and society by drawing attention to the people’s expressions of pain and 
suffering. But, as Teubner observes, ‘“normative expectations of global society” cannot alone 
justify lawmaking.’ What is required in order to ‘anchor such expectations’58 is, secondly, 
institutionalization. Ultimately, it is the legal system itself that decides on the validity of claims 
couched in legal terms: ‘(…) valid law can only arise where the condemnation of dubious 
practices as human rights violations under the legal code is for its part reflexively observed by 
operations governed by the legal code and incorporated into the recursiveness of legal 
operations.’59 In the context of world society, decisions on the validity of fundamental rights are 
not taken by states or state institutions, but primarily by arbitral tribunals within transnational 
regimes (such as investment tribunals and Internet panels operating under the lex mercatoria60): 
‘(…) the actual validity decision is made by the arbitral tribunals themselves when they select 
between different standards of fundamental rights in their individual rulings and specify which 
fundamental rights are bindingly valid in the particular regime.’ So it turns out that, in Teubner’s 
view, arbitral tribunals are the true legislators who are de facto responsible for creating a 
common law constitution for the new global society. The functions of adjudication and 
legislation, traditionally distinguished in the separation of powers doctrine, coincide fully. 
Because transnational regimes play a decisive role in the legislative process, Teubner concludes 
                                                            
53 Teubner 2006, 336. 
54 Teubner 2006, 336. 
55 Teubner 2006, 336. 
56 Teubner TFR, 4. 
57 Teubner 2006, 335. 
58 Teubner TFR, 4. 
59 Teubner TFR, 4. 
60 Teubner TFR, 5. 
that fundamental rights owe their universalization to ‘“social” positivization’ rather than ‘state 
positivization.’61  
 
Basically, what Teubner offers is a rough sociological description of how natural ‘rights’, as 
they manifest themselves in the outcries of the people, are gradually transformed, first into social 
norms, through the operations of intermediary organizations, and subsequently into legal norms 
(or fundamental rights without inverted comma’s) by sheer decision of arbitral tribunals. It is not 
a legal account, because it does not offer a satisfactory explanation why certain decisions should 
count as legal decisions. On what grounds can arbitral tribunals be attributed the legal authority 
to validate fundamental rights? The concept of ‘“social” positivization’ only covers the factual 
recognition of so-called natural rights as legal norms, but cannot grasp law as a normative 
phenomenon; no justification is given why the norms at hand ought to be recognized as legal 
norms.62 Moreover, Teubner is not able to reconstruct the law as a coherent system of norms, 
because he does not clarify the relationship between the various (state and transnational) 
decision-making instances and between the possibly contradictory decisions they may take. 
Although he still operates with the traditional distinction between private and public law63 – a 
distinction which can only be made sensibly within the domain of public law64 –, he seems to 
reject out of hand any appeal to hierarchy as a relic of the past. As a consequence, possible 
conflicts between norms cannot be solved and no legal order can be established. What indeed 
remains is a ‘bric-a-brac of decisions,’65 taken ‘freely’ by institutions of a dubious legal nature, 
with no apparent concern for legal unity – which provide a very shaky basis for a common law 
constitution, to say the least.  
 
Apart from the seemingly technical-legal issues of validity and legality, questions arise about the 
legitimacy of the decisions taken by legal or quasi-legal institutions. How to assess the quality 
and acceptability of these decisions? Teubner does seem to rule out the possibility of a ‘humanly 
just self-limitation of communication,’66 but at the same time he denies ‘it ever being possible to 
say positively what the conditions of ‘humanly just’ communication might be.’67 Instead, he 
proposes to address the issue of the justice of human rights negatively, in terms of ‘removing 
                                                            
61 Teubner TFR, 6. 
62 As Kelsen argued against Ehrlich, normative claims on the validity of law necessarily presuppose a legal point of 
view. See Hans Kelsen, “Eine Grundlegung der Rechtssoziologie,” in: Hans Kelsen and Eugen Ehrlich, 
Rechtssoziologie und Rechtswissenschaft. Eine Kontroverse (1915/1917) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlags-
gesellschaft, 2003), 3-54, 14 ff. 
63 By holding on to the notion of ‘private law’ (for instance in Teubner TFR, 14), he has by implication recognized 
the existence of public law. Otherwise, the adjective ‘private’ would make no sense. 
64 Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (second edition), tr. M. Knight (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), 
280-4. 
65 This characterization is taken from Kladders and is cited approvingly in Teubner TFR, 7. 
66 Teubner 2006, 346. 
67 Teubner TFR, 22. 
unjust situations.’68 The question is, however, how an unjust situation can be recognized without 
any notion of justice. Moreover, how can it be secured that the decisions taken actually represent 
the needs and wishes of the actual people? In Teubner’s account, the prospects for public 
participation in the decision-making process are not very good. By mocking the ‘naivety of 
participatory romanticism,’ he seems to reject direct democracy.69 But are there perhaps any 
other ways for the people to participate in the legislative process and influence its outcomes? Not 
really, or so it seems. According to Teubner, there is an ‘unbridgeable gap between social 
institutions and actual people.’70 The problem remains that systems and people cannot 
communicate with each other; they are only capable of mutual irritation. Homo communicans 
may send out SOS signals and he may even call upon intermediary organizations as megaphone, 
but ultimately it depends on the willingness or ‘responsiveness’71 of legal institutions whether he 
succeeds in getting his message of agony across. If so, the message will inevitably be distorted 
because the institution at hand has to translate, and thereby transform, it into the legal code.  
 
This brings us, finally, to the institutional task of application. (I will leave the administration 
aside, because almost nothing is said about the execution and enforcement of fundamental 
rights.72) Legal institutions that have to apply fundamental rights face a nearly impossible 
mission. To begin with, it is not at all clear against whom the fundamental rights should be 
invoked. In Teubner’s understanding, fundamental rights apply in the relation between people on 
the one hand, and ‘autonomized communicative processes’ constituting the ‘anonymous Matrix’ 
on the other. But ‘communicative processes’ are not easily summoned before the court, 
especially not when they remain anonymous. Teubner is, of course, well-aware of this problem: 
‘Translated into the languages of society and the law, this becomes a problem of attribution. 
Whodunit?’73 However, he reacts by downplaying our expectations regarding the permeability of 
the legal system and legal doctrine: ‘How can the law describe the boundary conflict, when after 
all it has only the language of ‘rights’ of ‘persons’ available? Here we reach the limits not only 
of what is conceivable in legal doctrine, but also the limits of court proceedings too.’74 That may 
be right, but it begs the question why the problem had to be conceptualized in terms of ‘rights’ in 
the first place, when legally speaking these so-called rights have no chance of ever entering the 
realms of legal practice and legal theory.  
 
Furthermore, the question is what exactly has to be applied. Teubner seems to assume that 
human rights are simply given in a mythical state of nature that precedes the legal, political and 
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social order in time – again,75 they are supposed to be of a ‘“pre-legal”, “pre-political”, even 
“pre-social”’ nature – that is located somewhere beyond society in the ‘extra-social’ space of 
environment. But how can the content of these ‘natural’ ‘rights’ be determined? According to 
Teubner, ‘[o]nly the self-observation of mind/body – introspection, suffering, pain – can judge 
whether communication infringes human rights.’76 But information from introspection generates 
only subjective, no objective knowledge. The real people may claim that their feelings are hurt, 
but does that necessarily mean that their human rights really have been infringed? Introspection 
does not provide a criterion on which basis false or irrelevant claims can be distinguished from 
legitimate claims. On a more principled basis, I would argue that rights cannot be conceived of 
beyond the space-time continuum of our existing institutions. As Lembcke writes, ‘politics is a 
space that emerges, if social norms (morality, tradition etc.) are inefficient in coordinating 
collective behavior.’77 After and through political decision-making, legal norms are created.78 
Subsequently, courts have to apply these general norms to concrete cases. This requires a kind of 
analogical reasoning that Oakeshott has characterized as ‘retrospective casuistry’: from previous 
similar cases a general norm is abstracted in which the conditions are specified to assess the case 
at hand.79 Since the legal system has to manifest itself as a coherent whole – in order to establish 
order instead of chaos –, both the creation and application of law have to depart from the already 
existing and accepted set of legal norms: new norms and new applications of norms have to fit 
the current legal system.  
 
Teubner fails to appreciate that rights have to be articulated and developed from within 
institutionalised hermeneutic contexts. They do not exist somewhere in the ‘atopia’80 or non-
place of environment, but are consciously and constantly created and recreated within existing 
legal and political institutions that have to decide on the law’s content, never entirely freely but 
inevitably with some distance from the public arena. Evidently, social norms may inspire the 
creation and application of legal norms, but the ‘colère publique’ itself cannot be translated 
directly into legal terms, not only because it is often too inarticulate and diffuse but, more 
importantly, because it contains impossible and contradictory demands (people may want too 
much and different people may want different things). Therefore, the constitutionalization of 
global society is no simple matter of making the latent manifest through social positivization and 
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78 For an account of how legal norms are created, see Hans Kelsen, Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory. A 
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80 I have taken this notion from Ludger Heidbrink, Handeln in der Ungewissheit: Paradoxien der Verantwortung 
(Berlin: Kulturverlag Kadmos, 2007), 114. 
by means of an arbitrary selection of arbitral tribunals. What is required, in my view, is a more 
serious and formalized institutional structure consisting of established legal and political 
authorities that have both the competence to take legitimate decisions and the power to enforce 
them.  
 
4 Epilogue 
 
Teubner should definitively be praised for ‘thinking big’. Whereas contemporary legal theory 
often contents itself with clever conceptual analyses into the nature of law, he does not shy away 
from addressing the great social problems of today’s world and proposing challenging, if not 
revolutionary solutions for them. However, for my narrow mind, Teubner’s thinking is 
sometimes too big. Although I appreciate his courage and boldness to propose a common law 
constitution for global society, I do not think it can be built on these shaky conceptual, normative 
and institutional foundations. I consider Teubner’s celebration of the ‘living law’81 to be a 
regressive attempt to break away from the institutionalized, and therefore inevitably specialized, 
professionalized and autonomized structures in which politics is practiced in modern society. But 
there is no escape: the effort to depolitize society is a highly political exercise in itself that has to 
make use of all the resources available in the political system in order to be successful. (Some 
may be tempted to call it a paradox, but in truth it is a plain contradiction.) So instead of 
reverting to alternative arrangements with questionable legal and democratic credentials, I would 
suggest working from established legal and political institutions within a concrete order,82 
despite their imperfections and limitations, to try to improve them. In doing so, we do best not to 
set our hopes too high. There are things - many things - that cannot be achieved by legal and 
political means, among which a fundamental reorganization of the communicative world order.  
 
The point is not to ban the ‘political power medium’83 from certain areas of society – if it were 
possible84 –, but to prevent that people are dominated by one medium only. This is what 
                                                            
81 See notes 45 and 53. A critical discussion of this notion can be found in Bart van Klink, “Facts and Norms. The 
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Marquard tries to capture in his understanding of the separation of powers principle. In 
Marquard’s view, freedom is not so much the absence of external forces affecting people as well 
as the presence of a plurality of forces: ‘There is only freedom for the people, if they are exposed 
to many forces – political formations, economic forces, divine powers, stories, convictions: not 
to none at all and not to only one, but to many.’85 Law may contribute to the separation of 
powers in this sense, particularly by granting people freedom of expression (as always, within 
limits). For the rest it has to be left to society, as part of the public debate, to develop a multitude 
of discourses. From this perspective, the dissemination of languages that followed upon the 
breakdown of Babel can be seen as a blessing rather than a curse. 
 
To conclude, I would recommend that ambitions not be stretched too far, but to start from local 
traditions and institutions.86 If we cannot achieve justice for everyone, everywhere and always, 
we should aim at creating and sustaining as long as we can some islands of peace and quiet in the 
overwhelming sea of chaos, not by rejecting or bypassing the institutions we have, but on the 
contrary by mobilizing and reinforcing them. Probably we will never succeed in rebuilding the 
Tower of Babel, but we may at least hope to preserve, however locally and temporarily, a 
civilized way of living together among its ruins. 
 
 
                                                            
85 Odo Marquard, “Apologie der Bürgerlichkeit,” in: Zukunft braucht Herkunft. Philosophische Essays (Philipp 
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gibt es nur dann Freiheit, wenn viele Mächte – politische Formationen, Wirtschaftskräfte, Sakralgewalten, 
Geschichten, Überzeugungen – auf sie einwirken: nicht gar keine und nicht nur eine, sondern viele.’  
86 Along the lines indicated by Oakeshott 1975. 
Summary 
 
The Destruction and Reconstruction of the Tower of Babel 
Bart van Klink 
 
In this article I present some critical comments concerning the conceptual, normative and 
institutional foundations of Teubner’s plea for a ‘common law constitution’ which question the 
desirability of the means chosen for attaining this objective as well as their efficacy. In 
particular, I have difficulties with, first, the ambivalent role that is assigned to man, either as a 
person or as a human being; second, the reduction of social problems to problems of 
communication; and, finally and most importantly, the attempt to conceive of law and politics 
beyond established legal and political institutions, which in my view is doomed to fail. In my 
conclusion I give some tentative suggestions for an alternative approach.  
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